Odbor kompatibility s právem ES Úřad vlády ČR	I S A P Informační Systém pro Aproximaci Práva
	Databáze č. 17 : Databáze judikatury

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	Číslo (Kód CELEX): Number (CELEX Code):		61979J0131

	Název: Title:		JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 22 MAY 1980. REGINA V SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HOME AFFAIRS, EX PARTE MARIO SANTILLO. PRELIMINARY RULING REQUESTED BY THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, QUEEN' S BENCH DIVISION, DIVISIONAL COURT. FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS. CASE 131-79.

	Publikace: Publication:		REPORTS OF CASES 1980 PAGES 1585 - 1603

	Předmět (klíčová slova): Keywords		FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS;

	Související předpisy: Corresponding acts:		364L0221

	Odkaz na souvisejicí judikáty: Corresponding Judgements:		Bouchereau Case 30/77 Bouchereau [1977] ECR 1999 · [710] Gallagher Case C-175/94 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Gallagher [1995] ECR I-4253


	Plný text: Fulltext:		Ne

Fakta:
Mr Mario Santillo, an Italian national, had been working in the United Kingdom since 1967. In 1973, Mr Santillo was convicted of buggery and rape committed on a prostitute and of indecent assault and assault occasioning bodily harm on another prostitute. He was sentenced to a total of eight years’ imprisonment. When giving the judgement, the Central Criminal Court made a recommendation for deportation under the Immigration Act. In 1978, the Secretary of state made a deportation order against him to take effect when his prison sentence was completed. having completed his prison sentence in 1979 after remission of one third for good behaviour, Mr Santillo was due to be released but remained in detention under the Immigration Act.
Mr Santillo thereupon applied to the High Court to set aside the deportation order on the ground that, having been made more than four years after the recommendation for deportation by the Central Criminal Court, it infringed his individual rights for failure to comply with the provisions of Article 9(1) of Council Directive 64/221/EEC Of 25 February 1964 on the co-ordination of special measures concerning the movement and residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health (OJ, English Special Edition, 1963-1964, p. 117).
Article 9(1) provides:“Where there is no right of appeal to a court of law, or where such appeal may be only in respect of the legal validity of the decision, or where appeal cannot have suspensory effect, a decision refusing renewal of a residence permit or ordering that the expulsion of the holder of a residence permit from the territory shall not be taken by the administrative authority, save in cases of urgency, until an opinion has been obtained from a competent authority of the host country before which the person concerned enjoys such rights of defence and of assistance or representation as the domestic law provides for.
This authority shall not be the same as that empowered to take the decision refusing renewal of the residence permit or ordering expulsion.”. The High Court stayed the proceedings and under Article 177 of the Treaty referred to the Court of Justice the questions (1) whether Article 9(1) of Directive 64/221 confers individual right on nationals of the Member States; (2) how the phrase “an opinion has been obtained from the competent authority of the host country” was to be interpreted and, in particular, whether a recommendation for deportation made by a criminal court on passing sentence constituted such “opinion”; (3a) whether such opinion must be fully reasoned, (3b) whether the lapse of time between the making of a “recommendation” and the taking of the decision ordering the expulsion precluded it from constituting an “opinion” within the meaning of Article 9(1).

Názor soudu a komentář:
The Court does not agree that the relevant Community law provides for a general principle that full compensation must be granted if animals have been slaughtered for the purpose of eradication of swine fever. In particular, such principle cannot be inferred from the Community measures regarding African swine fever because this is a disease which is considerably different from classical swine fever. The directives on the eradication of classical swine fever, on the other hand, “merely intended to lay down sanitary and preventive measures which the Member States are required to take” but do not concern themselves with the financial aspects of the implementation of those measures or with the question of compensation. Decision 80/1096 does contain rules on compensation; it does not, however, go so far as to introduce a principle of Community policy which would be uniformly applicable in the field of classical swine fever. Finally, the provisions of Article 2 (1) (f) of Decision 80/1097 and of Article 2 (1)(c) of Decision 90/217, which contain compensation rules, concern special cases so that a general principle cannot be inferred from them.
The Court also rejects the argument that these Community rules were invalid because they constituted a discrimination contrary to Article 7 of the EEC Treaty. As has become clear from the foregoing discussion, the Community measures on control of classical swine fever do not contain a system of compensation in the first place; thus, there cannot be any different treatment on the ground of nationality with respect to compensation. “Neither can the fact that certain Member States, in the context of the competence they retain, have adopted a system of compensation for those owners whereas other Member States have not done so constitute an infringement of the Treaty.” On the other hand, the fact that Community law prescribes compensation in cases where animals have been slaughtered in order to control other animal diseases than swine fever but does not prescribe so for classical swine fever does not constitute unlawful discrimination because the diseases are different so as to constitute an objective ground that justifies the different treatment.
Soud nesouhlasí s tím, že příslušný komunitární akt zakládá obecný princip, že plná kompenzace musí být zaručena v případech, kdy zvířata byla poražena za účelem vymýcení klasického prasečího moru. Obzvláště pak takový princip nemůže být vyvozován z opatření týkajících se afrického prasečího moru, neboť ten je nemocí značně odlišnou od klasického prasečího moru. Směrnice ohledně vymýcení klasického prasečího moru, na straně druhé, “ více zamýšlejí stanovit hygienická a preventivní opatření , jež mají členské státy provést” než že by se samy týkaly finančních aspektů provádění těchto opatření či snad otázky kompenzace. Rozhodnutí 80/1096 neobsahuje pravidla kompenzace ; nejde však ani tak daleko , že by zavedlo princip komunitární politiky, jež by byl jednotně aplikovatelný v otázce klasického prasečího moru. Konečně ustanovení článku 2(1) rozhodnutí 80/1097 a článku 2(1) rozhodnutí 90/217, jež obsahují kompenzační pravidla, se týkají specielních případů, čili se z nich nemůže vyvozovat obecný princip.
Soud také odmítá argument, dle kterého by tato komunitární pravidla byla neplatná z toho důvodu, že by zakládala diskriminaci v rozporu s čl. čl. 7 Smlouvy EHS. Z předcházející diskuze se jeví jasným fakt, že komunitární opatření ohledně kontroly klasického prasečího moru neobsahují systém kompenzace na prvním místě ; proto nepřichází v úvahu žádné rozdílné zacházení v otázce kompenzace založené na národnosti. “ Ani fakt, že určitý členský stát, v souvislosti s kompetencí, kterou si ponechává , přijal systém kompenzace pro své občany, zatímco ostatní členské státy takto neučinily, není porušením Smlouvy ES. Na straně druhé fakt, že komunitární právo poskytuje kompenzaci v případech, kdy zvířata byla poražena proto, aby se dostala pod kontrolu jiná zvířecí onemocnění než je prasečí mor, ale nečiní tak v případě klasického prasečího moru, nezakládá nezákonnou diskriminaci, neboť nemoce jsou tak rozdílné, že zakládají možnost objektivního rozlišení ospravedlňující rozdílné zacházení.
1) Soud ve svém rozsudku dává posudek/názor ohledně komunitárních měřítek /opatření na kontrolu prasečí mor, jenž je shrnut v následující tabulce :Opatření Číslo Datum Název Odkaz 1. Opatření na vymýcení klasického prasečího morusměrnice 80/217 22.1.1980 zavádějící komun. opatření na OJ 1980 L 47,p.11 klasický prasečí mor směrnice 80/1095 11.11.1980 stanovující požadované podmínky na zachování území Společenství OJ 1980 L 325,p.1 nezasaženého klas. pras. morem rozhodnutí 80/1096 11.11.1980 zavádějící komunitární finanční OJ 1980 L 325,p.5 opatření za vymýcení kl pras. moru rozhodnutí 88/529 7.10. 1986 souhlasející s plánem na vymýcení kl. pras. moru OJ 1988 L 291,p.78 představený Belgickým královstvím 2. Opatření na vymýcení africké prasečí horečky rozhodnutí 80/1097 11.11.1980 ve věci finanč. pomoci od ES na vymýcení afrického OJ 1980 L 325,p.8 pras. moru v Sardinii rozhodnutí 90/217 25.4.1990 ve věci finanční pomoci od ES na vymýcení afrického OJ 1990L 116,p.24In English law, the remedies available against a deportation order relate only to the legal validity of that order. Consequently, a deportation order may be made only in accordance with the provisions of Article 9 of Directive 64/221, which makes express provision for such a case. This provision is intended to ensure a minimum procedural safeguard for persons affected by one of the measures referred to in the three cases set out in Article 9(1) of the Directive. The purpose of the intervention of the “competent authority” “is to enable an exhaustive examination of all the facts and circumstances including the expediency of the proposed measure to be carried out before the decision is finally taken. Furthermore the person concerned must be able to exercise before that authority such rights of defence and of assistance or representation as the domestic law of that country provides for.” The Court finds that the provisions contained in Article 9(1) of Council Directive 64/221 are sufficiently clear and precise as to be directly applicable.
The Directive does not exhaustively define the “competent authority”. “It refers to an authority which must be independent of the administration, but gives the Member States a margin of discretion in regard of the nature of the authority.” (see also [710] Gallagher) Since the criminal courts in the United Kingdom are independent of the administration, they may thus qualify as “competent authority” within the meaning of Article 9(1). Accordingly, a recommendation such as that in issue presently may constitute an “opinion”, provided that the other conditions of Article 9 are satisfied (see also Bouchereau).
In order to satisfy the purpose of Article 9 of the Directive, it is “essential that the social danger resulting from a foreigner’s presence should be assessed at the very time when the decision ordering expulsion is made against him as the factor to be taken into account, particularly those concerning his conduct, are likely to change in the course of time”. A recommendation such as that in the present case, made at the time of the conviction, cannot thus be regarded as an “opinion” within the meaning of Article 9(1) for a deportation order made after the prison term has been served.
Finally, an “opinion” must state the reasons so as to put both the administration and the person concerned “in a position to take cognizance of the reasons which led the ‘competent authority’ to give its opinion”.

Shrnutí (Summary of the Judgment):
1. ARTICLE 9 OF DIRECTIVE NO 64/221 IMPOSES OBLIGATIONS ON MEMBER STATES WHICH MAY BE RELIED UPON BY THE PERSONS CONCERNED BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS.

2. DIRECTIVE NO 64/221 LEAVES A MARGIN OF DISCRETION TO MEMBER STATES IN REGARD TO THE DEFINITION OF THE'' COMPETENT AUTHORITY'' REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 9 (1). ANY PUBLIC AUTHORITY INDEPENDENT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY CALLES UPON TO ADOPT ONE OF THE MEASURES REFERRED TO BY THE DIRECTIVE, WHICH IS SO CONSTITUTED THAT THE PERSON CONCERNED ENJOYS THE RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION AND OF DEFENCE BEFORE IT, MAY BE CONSIDERED AS SUCH AN AUTHORITY.

3. A RECOMMENDATION FOR DEPORTATION MADE UNDER BRITISH LEGISLATION BY A CRIMINAL COURT AT THE TIME OF CONVICTION MAY CONSTITUTE AN OPINION UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF DIRECTIVE NO 64/221 PROVIDED THAT THE OTHER CONDITIONS OF ARTICLE 9 ARE SATISFIED. THE CRIMINAL COURT MUST TAKE ACCOUNT IN PARTICULAR OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE DIRECTIVE INASMUCH AS THE MERE EXISTENCE OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS MAY NOT AUTOMATICALLY CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR DEPORTATION MEASURES.

4. THE OPINION OF THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 9 (1) OF DIRECTIVE NO 64/221 MUST BE SUFFICIENTLY PROXIMATE IN TIME TO THE DECISION ORDERING EXPULSION TO PROVIDE AN ASSURANCE THAT THERE ARE NO NEW FACTORS TO BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. A LAPSE OF TIME AMOUNTING TO SEVERAL YEARS BETWEEN THE RECOMMENDATION FOR DEPORTATION ON THE ONE HAND AND THE DECISION BY THE ADMINISTRATION ON THE OTHER IS LIABLE TO DEPRIVE THE RECOMMENDATION OF ITS FUNCTION AS AN OPINION WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE

9. IT IS INDEED ESSENTIAL THAT THE SOCIAL DANGER RESULTING FROM A FOREIGNER' S PRESENCE SHOULD BE ASSESSED AT THE VERY TIME WHEN THE DECISION ORDERING EXPULSION IS MADE AGAINST HIM AS THE FACTS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, PARTICULARLY THOSE CONCERNING HIS CONDUCT, ARE LIKELY TO CHANGE IN THE COURSE OF TIME.

5. BOTH THE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY QUALIFIED TO MAKE THE DEPORTATION ORDER AND THE PERSON CONCERNED SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE REASONS WHICH LED THE'' COMPETENT AUTHORITY'' TO GIVE THE OPINION REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 9 (1) OF DIRECTIVE NO 64/221 - SAVE WHERE GROUNDS TOUCHING THE SECURITY OF THE STATE REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 6 OF THE DIRECTIVE MAKE THIS UNDESIRABLE.

Plný text judikátu (Entire text of the Judgment):