Odbor kompatibility s právem ES
Úřad vlády ČR
I S A P
Informační Systém pro Aproximaci Práva
Databáze č. 17 : Databáze judikatury
ă Odbor kompatibility s právem ES, Úřad vlády ČR - určeno pouze pro potřebu ministerstev a ostatních ústředních orgánů

Číslo (Kód CELEX):
Number (CELEX Code):		61984J0205
Název:
Title: 		JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 4 DECEMBER 1986. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES V FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES - INSURANCE. CASE 205/84.
Rozhodnutí ESD ze dne 4. prosince 1986
Věc 205/84
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany
[1986] ECR 3755 “Insurance Services”
Publikace:
Publication:		REPORTS OF CASES 1986 PAGES 3755 - 3815
Předmět (klíčová slova):
Keywords		FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT AND SERVICES;FREE MOVEMENT OF SERVICES;
Související předpisy:
Corresponding acts:		157E059;157E060;378L0473
Odkaz na souvisejicí judikáty:
Corresponding Judgements:
    682J0029, 678J0110, 678J0111, 680J0279
    - Van Luipen, věc 29/82 Van Luipen [1983] ECR 151
    - Wesemeal, spojené věci 110 a 111/78 Ministére Public and Another v Wesemeal and Others [1979] ECR 35
    - Webb, věc 279/80 Webb [1981] ECR 3305
Plný text:
Fulltext:		Ne

Fakta:
The Commission under Articel 169 of the Treaty claimed that Germany had failed to fulfil certain obligations under Community law in the insurance sector. It claimed in particular that
A third claim, which the Commission had in the course of the proceedings modified, was deemed insufficiently grounded with respect to its original version and inadmissible with respect to the modified version because this was wider in scope than the original application. This claim is therefore not taken into account in the following summary.
(1) Germany had failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty in relation to direct insurance business, other than transport insurance, through salesmen, representatives, agents or other intermediaries, by requiring that such persons must be established and authorized in the Federal Republic.
The claim of the Commission was more detailed in that it also contended that Germany had also failed to fulfil its obligations by providing that insurance brokers established in the Federal Republic of Germany may not arrange contracts of insurance for persons resident in the Federal Republic with insurers established in another Member State. The Court, however, found that the establishment and authorization requirements with respect to brokers were, in effect, the same as those required for insurance undertakings. It thus found no need to separate the two issues.
(2) Germany had failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty and under Council Directive 78/473/EEC
Of 30 May 1978 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to Community co-insurance (OJ 1978, L 151, p. 25).
by providing in relation to Community co-insurance operations that the leading insurer (in the case of risk situated in the Federal Republic of Germany) must be established in that State and authorized there to cover the risks insured also as sole insurer.
Na základě ustanovení článku 169 Smlouvy podala Komise žalobu proti Německu pro nesplnění určitých závazků vyplývajících z práva Společenství v oblasti pojišťovnictví. Komise zejména tvrdila, že
1
1
Třetí část žaloby, kterou Komise v průběhu řízení upravila, byla ve své původní verzi považována za nedostatečně podloženou a její upravená verze byla prohlášena za nepřípustnou, neboť upravená verze byla co do rozsahu širší než verze původní. Toto shrnutí proto nebere tuto část žaloby v potaz.
:
(1) Německo tím, že požadovalo, aby obchodní cestující, zástupci, zprostředkovatelů nebo jiných prostředníků, vyjma pojištění přepravy, měli své sídlo a byli autorizováni ve Spolkové republice nesplnilo ve vztahu k přímým pojišťovacím činnostem svou povinnost vyplývající z článků 59 a 60 Smlouvy.
2
2
V této části byla žaloba Komise detailnější, přičemž tvrdila, že Německo rovněž opomnělo splnit své povinnosti tím, že zakázalo, aby pojišťovací prostředníci se sídlem ve Spolkové republice Německo uzavírali pojišťovací smlouvy mezi osobami žijícími v Německu a pojišťovnami se sídlem v jiném členském státě. Soud však došel k závěru, že požadavky ohled
n
ě sídla a autorizace prostředníků jsou ve skutečnosti shodné s těmi, které jsou kladeny na pojišťovací podniky. Proto není třeba tyto dvě otázky oddělovat.

(2) Německo nesplnilo své závazky vyplývající z článků 59 a 60 Smlouvy a ze směrnice 78/473/EHS
3
3
Z 30. května 1978 o harmonizaci práva, norem a správních ustanovení týkajících se komunitárního spolupojištění (OJ 1978, L 151, str. 25).
, tím, že ve vztahu ke komunitárnímu spolupojištění vyžadovalo, aby vedoucí pojišťovatel (v případě rizika vztahujícího se ke Spolkové republice Německo) měl sídlo a autorizaci pojišťovat rizika jako samostatný pojišťovatel v tomto státě.

Názor soudu a komentář:
The judgement is of importance not only with respect to the Community insurance law but also, more generally, with respect to the freedom to provide services. At the outset, the Court makes it clear that the provision of insurance in another Member State falls within the scope of the freedom to provide services; it restates that the provisions of Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty are directly applicable as from the expiry of the transitional period. The Court then turns to two important limitations of the freedom to provide services: On the one hand, the Court determines the scope of application of Article 59 in relation to the right of establishment (Article 52), on the other hand, the Court points out that restrictions to the freedom to provide services may be justified for reasons of the “general good”.
The scope of the freedom to provide services is on the one hand determined by the definition of “services” provided in the first paragraph of Article 60: “Services shall be considered to be ‘services’ within the meaning of this Treaty where they are normally provided for remuneration, in so far as they are not governed by the provisions relating to freedom of movement for goods, capital and persons.” “[I]t is, however, necessary to determine the scope of those articles [59 and 60] in relation of the provision of the Treaty on the right of establishment. In that respect, it must be acknowledged that an insurance undertaking of another Member State which maintains a permanent presence in the Member State in question comes within the scope of the provisions of the Treaty on the right of establishment, even if that presence does not take the form of a branch or agency but consists merely of an office managed by the undertaking’s own staff or by a person who is independent but authorized to act on a permanent basis for the undertaking, as would be the case with an agency. In the light of the aforementioned definition contained in the first paragraph of Article 60, such an insurance undertaking cannot therefore avail itself of Articles 59 and 60 with regard to the activities in the Member State in question.” The Court thus construes the right of establishment as being more specific and thus of priority in relation to the freedom to provide services. In addition, it broadly construes the right of establishment so as to also cover, e.g., an agency, thus substantially limiting the scope of Articles 59 and 60. Consequently, these Articles will only rarely be applicable with respect to insurance since this business regularly requires a certain presence in the state where the person insured lives.
The second limitation regards restrictions on grounds of the general good (see also
Wesemeal
,
Webb
) Such restrictions are compatible with Community law provided (1) that they are mandated by the general good and that they are applicable without discrimination, (2) that the interest pursued by the restriction must not already be covered by the law of the undertaking’s home country and (3) the measure chosen must be the least intrusive restriction.
With respect to the authorization and establishment requirements presently at issue, the Court accepts that these restrictions pursue a valid purpose (1), i.e. consumer protection which is necessary because of the specific nature of the services provided by the insurer. The Court, secondly, ascertains that the public interest is not already protected by the rules of the State of establishment (2). Thirdly, the Court goes on to examine the necessity of the restrictions (3): With respect to the authorization requirement it agrees that “in the present state of Community law” the Member States could be justified in providing their own legislation concerning technical reserves and conditions of insurance; they may, however, “not duplicate equivalent statutory conditions which have already been satisfied in the State in which the undertaking is established”. As to the establishment requirement, the Court, finding that it “is the very negative of [the] freedom” of establishment, does not accept that this was necessary in order to ensure effective control of insurance undertakings. With reference to its case-law (
Van Luipen
) the Court points out “that considerations of an administrative nature cannot justify derogation by a Member State from the rules of Community law”. In order to establish the necessity of the establishment requirement, it would be necessary to show that the State “cannot, even under an authorization procedure, carry out their supervisory tasks effectively unless the undertaking has in the aforesaid State a permanent establishment at which all the necessary documents are kept. That has not been shown to be the case.” While it upholds the authorization requirement, the Court thus finds that the establishment requirement is not compatible with Community law.
The second question concerned a special type of insurance, the co-insurance, which is being treated in Directive 43/473. German law provided for an establishment and authorization requirement for the leading insurer in case of a co-insurance. While it follows from the answer given to the first question that the establishment requirement cannot be upheld under Community law, the authorization requirement would seem to be compatible with those provisions. The Court, however, points out that cases of co-insurance concern only large undertakings “which are in a position to assess and negotiate insurance policies proposed to them”. Thus, also the authorization requirement could not be justified on the ground of “consumer protection” (“general good”) and the Court consequently declares that the Federal Republic had failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty and under Directive 78/473 also by imposing such requirement with respect to co-insurance.
Toto rozhodnutí má význam nejen
om z hlediska komunitárního pojišťovacího práva, ale obecněji i v souvislosti se svobodou poskytovat služby. Soud začal objasňováním otázky, zda poskytování pojišťovacích služeb v jiném členském státě spadá pod ustanovení o svobodě poskytovat služby; zopa
k
oval svůj závěr, že ustanovení článků 59 a 60 Smlouvy jsou od konce přechodného období přímo aplikovatelné. Pak se věnoval dvěma zásadním omezením svobody poskytovat služby. Na jedné straně určil rozsah aplikace článku 59 ve vztahu ke svobodě usazovací (č
l
ánek 52), a na straně druhé zdůraznil, že omezení svobody poskytovat služby může být odůvodněno “obecným blahem”.
Rozsah svobody poskytovat služby je na jedné straně určen definicí “služeb”, která je obsažena v článku 60: “Za služby se podle této Smlouvy pokládají úkony poskytované zpravidla za úplatu, pokud nejsou upraveny ustanoveními o volném pohybu zboží, kapitálu s osob.” “[J]e však nutné určit působnost těchto článků [59 a 60] ve vztahu k ustanovení Smlouvy o právu usazovat se. V tomto ohledu je tře
b
a uznat, že se na pojišťovací podnik jiného členského státu, který působí v dotčeném členském státě, aplikují ustanovení Smlouvy, která upravují právo usazovat se, i když jejich působení nemá podobu organizační složky nebo obchodního zastoupení, ale sestá
v
á se pouze z kanceláře, kterou vede vlastní personál podniku nebo nezávislá osoba s oprávněním trvale jednat za podnik, jako by tomu bylo v případě skutečného zastoupení. Ve světle výše uvedené definice článku 60 prvního odstavce daný pojišťovací podnik n
e
může na sebe, v souvislosti se svými aktivitami v daném členském státě, vztahovat články 59 a 60.” Soud tímto konstruoval svobodu usazovací jako specifičtější, a proto nadřazenou, svobodě poskytovat služby. Navíc konstruoval právo na usazování tak široce,

že pokrývá i zastoupení, čímž zásadně omezil působnost článků 59 a 60. V důsledku toho se články 59 a 60 budou zřídka aplikovat na pojišťovnictví, neboť tato činnost pravidelně vyžaduje určité zastoupení ve státě, kde pojištěnec žije.
Druhé omezení se týk
á omezení z důvodů obecného blaha (viz také
Wesemeal, Webb
). Taková omezení jsou slučitelná s právem Společenství za předpokladu, že (1) byly stanoveny z důvodů obecného blaha a jsou aplikovatelné bez diskriminace, (2) zájem, který omezení sleduje, nesmí být již zabezpečen právem domovského státu podniku a (3) zvolené opatření musí být nejméně rušivým omezením.
Co se týče požadavků sídla a autorizace Soud akceptoval, že tato omezení vyhovují účel (1) tj. z důvodu ochrany spotřebitele, která je nezbytná v souvislosti se specifickým charakterem služeb poskytovaných pojišťovatelem. Za druhé Soudní dvůr hodnotil, zda veřejný zájem již není chráněn normami státu, kde má podnik hlavní sídlo (2). Nakonec Soud zkoumal nezbytnost omezení podle bodu (3): Co se týče
p
ožadavku autorizace, Soud souhlasil s tím, že “za současného stavu práva Společenství” mohou být členské státy oprávněny vydávat svou vlastní legislativu upravující technické rezervy a podmínky pojištění; “nesmí však dublovat zákonné podmínky, které již b
y
ly splněny ve státě, kde má podnik hlavní sídlo.” Ve vztahu k požadavku sídla Soud prohlásil, že vzhledem k tomu, že “tento neguje svobodu usazování”, odmítá tento požadavek jako nezbytný pro zajištění efektivní kontroly podniků poskytujících pojištění. S
odkazem na svou rozhodovací praxi (
Van Luipen
) Soudní dvůr podotkl, že “hlediska správního charakteru nemohou být důvodem k vyloučení norem Společenství členskými státy.” Pro prokázání nezbytnosti požadavku, aby se podnik v daném členském státě usadil, by členský stát musel dokázat, že “pokud podnik nemá v tomto státě trvalé sídlo, kde jsou archivovány všechny nezbytné dokumenty, nemůže efektivně plnit své povinnosti dozoru, a to ani na základě řízení o autorizaci. Toto však v daném případě nebylo prokázán
o
.” Soud tedy potvrdil požadavek autorizace, ale požadavek umístění hlavního sídla v daném členském státě zamítl jako neslučitelný s právem Společenství.
Druhá otázka se týkala zvláštního typu pojištění, a sice spolupojištění, které je upraveno směrnicí 43/473. V případě spolupojištění stanovilo německé právo požadavek hlavního sídla a autorizace v případě vedoucího pojišťovatele. Jak vyplývá z odpovědi na první otázku požadavek hlavního sídla je neslučitelný s právem Společenství, zatímco požadavek autori
z
ace ustanovení komunitárního práva vyhovuje. Soud však zdůraznil, že případy spolupojištění se týkají pouze velkých podniků “které hodnotí a vyjednávají pojišťovací politiku, která jim byla navržena.” Proto v tomto případě ani požadavek autorizace není os
p
ravedlněn “ochranou spotřebitele” (“obecným blahem”). V tomto smyslu Soud prohlásil, že Spolková republika Německo nesplnila povinnosti, které pro ni vyplývají z článků 59 a 60 Smlouvy a ze směrnice 78/473 tím, že stanovila tento požadavek i v případě spo
l
upojištění.

Shrnutí (Summary of the Judgment):
1. IN CARRYING OUT THE TASK, CONFERRED ON IT BY ARTICLE 155 OF THE TREATY, TO ENSURE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY ARE APPLIED, IT IS OPEN TO THE COMMISSION TO BRING AN ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 169 IF IT CONSIDERS THAT A MEMBER STATE HAS FAILED TO FULFIL ONE OF ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE TREATY. THE MERE FACT THAT A PROPOSAL FOR A LEGISLATIVE MEASURE, WHICH IF ADOPTED AND TRANSPOSED INTO NATIONAL LAW WOULD TERMINATE THE INFRINGEMENTS ALLEGED BY THE COMMISSION, HAS ALREADY BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE COUNCIL DOES NOT PREVENT THE COMMISSION FROM BRINGING SUCH AN ACTION.

2. AN INSURANCE UNDERTAKING OF ANOTHER MEMBER STATE WHICH MAINTAINS A PERMANENT PRESENCE IN THE MEMBER STATE IN WHICH IT PROVIDES SERVICES COMES WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY ON THE RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT EVEN IF THAT PRESENCE HAS NOT TAKEN THE FORM OF A BRANCH OR AGENCY, BUT CONSISTS MERELY OF AN OFFICE MANAGED BY THE UNDERTAKING' S OWN STAFF OR BY A PERSON WHO IS INDEPENDENT BUT AUTHORIZED TO ACT ON A PERMANENT BASIS FOR THE UNDERTAKING, AS WOULD BE THE CASE WITH AN AGENCY. SUCH AN INSURANCE UNDERTAKING CANNOT THEREFORE AVAIL ITSELF OF THE PROVISIONS RELATING TO FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES WITH REGARD TO ITS ACTIVITIES IN THE MEMBER STATE IN QUESTION. SIMILARLY, A MEMBER STATE CANNOT BE DENIED THE RIGHT TO TAKE MEASURES TO PREVENT THE EXERCISE BY A PERSON PROVIDING SERVICES, WHOSE ACTIVITY IS ENTIRELY OR PRINCIPALLY DIRECTED TOWARDS ITS TERRITORY, OF THE FREEDOM GUARANTEED BY ARTICLE 59 FOR THE PURPOSE OF AVOIDING THE PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT WHICH WOULD BE APPLICABLE TO HIM IF HE WE
RE ESTABLISHED WITHIN THAT STATE. SUCH A SITUATION MAY BE SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL CONTROL UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE CHAPTER RELATING TO THE RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT AND NOT OF THAT ON THE PROVISION OF SERVICES.

3. ARTICLES 59 AND 60 OF THE TREATY BECAME DIRECTLY APPLICABLE ON THE EXPIRY OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, AND THEIR APPLICABILITY WAS NOT CONDITIONAL ON THE HARMONIZATION OR THE COORDINATION OF THE LAWS OF THE MEMBER STATES. THOSE ARTICLES REQUIRE THE REMOVAL NOT ONLY OF ALL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST A PROVIDER OF A SERVICE ON THE GROUNDS OF HIS NATIONALITY BUT ALSO ALL RESTRICTIONS ON HIS FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES IMPOSED BY REASON OF THE FACT THAT HE IS ESTABLISHED IN A MEMBER STATE OTHER THAN THAT IN WHICH THE SERVICE IS TO BE PROVIDED.

4. THE FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES, AS ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE TREATY, MAY BE RESTRICTED ONLY BY PROVISIONS WHICH ARE JUSTIFIED BY THE GENERAL GOOD AND WHICH ARE APPLIED TO ALL PERSONS OR UNDERTAKINGS OPERATING WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF THE STATE IN WHICH THE SERVICE IS PROVIDED IN SO FAR AS THAT INTEREST IS NOT SAFEGUARDED BY THE PROVISIONS TO WHICH THE PROVIDER OF A SERVICE IS SUBJECT IN THE MEMBER STATE OF HIS ESTABLISHMENT. IN ADDITION, SUCH REQUIREMENTS MUST BE OBJECTIVELY JUSTIFIED BY THE NEED TO ENSURE THAT PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT ARE COMPLIED WITH AND THAT THE INTERESTS WHICH SUCH RULES ARE DESIGNED TO SAFEGUARD ARE PROTECTED.

5. SO FAR AS DIRECT INSURANCE IS CONCERNED, THE PROTECTION OF POLICY-HOLDERS AND INSURED PERSONS JUSTIFIES IN THE PRESENT STATE OF COMMUNITY LAW THE APPLICATION BY THE MEMBER STATE IN WHICH THE SERVICE IS PROVIDED OF ITS OWN LEGISLATION CONCERNING TECHNICAL RESERVES OR PROVISIONS AND THE CONDITIONS OF INSURANCE, PROVIDED THAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF THAT LEGISLATION DO NOT EXCEED WHAT IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE PROTECTION OF POLICY-HOLDERS AND INSURED PERSONS. ONLY THE REQUIREMENT OF AN AUTHORIZATION WHICH IT IS FOR THE MEMBER STATE IN WHICH THE SERVICES ARE PROVIDED TO GRANT AND WITHDRAW CAN PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF SUPERVISION AND IS THEREFORE PERMISSIBLE. THE AUTHORIZATION MUST BE GRANTED ON REQUEST TO ANY UNDERTAKING ESTABLISHED IN ANOTHER MEMBER STATE WHICH MEETS THE CONDITIONS LAID DOWN BY THE LEGISLATION OF THE STATE IN WHICH THE SERVICE IS PROVIDED. THOSE CONDITIONS MAY NOT DUPLICATE EQUIVALENT STATUTORY CONDITIONS WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN SATISFIED IN THE STATE IN WHICH THE UNDERTAKING IS ESTABLISHED
AND THE SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY OF THE STATE IN WHICH THE SERVICE IS PROVIDED MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SUPERVISION AND VERIFICATIONS WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN CARRIED OUT IN THE MEMBER STATE OF ESTABLISHMENT.

6. IF THE REQUIREMENT OF AN AUTHORIZATION CONSTITUTES A RESTRICTION ON THE FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES, THE REQUIREMENT OF A PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT IS THE VERY NEGATION OF THAT FREEDOM. IT HAS THE RESULT OF DEPRIVING ARTICLE 59 OF THE TREATY OF ALL EFFECTIVENESS, A PROVISION WHOSE VERY PURPOSE IS TO ABOLISH RESTRICTIONS ON THE FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES OF PERSONS WHO ARE NOT ESTABLISHED IN THE STATE IN WHICH THE SERVICE IS TO BE PROVIDED. SUCH A REQUIREMENT IS PERMISSIBLE ONLY IF IT CONSTITUTES A CONDITION WHICH IS INDISPENSABLE FOR ATTAINING THE OBJECTIVE PURSUED. SO FAR AS THE PROVISION OF DIRECT INSURANCE SERVICES IS CONCERNED, IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT THAT THE PRESENCE ON THE UNDERTAKING' S PREMISES OF ALL THE DOCUMENTS NEEDED FOR SUPERVISION BY THE AUTHORITIES OF THE STATE IN WHICH THE SERVICE IS PROVIDED MAY MAKE IT EASIER FOR THOSE AUTHORITIES TO PERFORM THEIR TASK. IT MUST ALSO BE THE CASE THAT THOSE AUTHORITIES CANNOT, EVEN UNDER AN AUTHORIZATION PROCEDURE, CARRY OUT THEIR SUPERVISORY TASKS EFFECTIVEL
Y UNLESS THE UNDERTAKING HAS IN THE AFORESAID STATE A PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT AT WHICH ALL THE NECESSARY DOCUMENTS ARE KEPT. THAT IS NOT THE CASE, AS COMMUNITY LAW STANDS AT PRESENT.

7. WHEN THE WORDING OF SECONDARY COMMUNITY LAW IS OPEN TO MORE THAN ONE INTERPRETATION, PREFERENCE SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE INTERPRETATION WHICH RENDERS THE PROVISION CONSISTENT WITH THE TREATY RATHER THAN THE INTERPRETATION WHICH LEADS TO ITS BEING INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE TREATY.

8. IN THE CASE OF THE INSURANCE TO WHICH DIRECTIVE 78/473 ON CO-INSURANCE AP- PLIES, NOT ONLY THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE LEADING INSURER BE ESTABLISHED BUT ALSO THE REQUIREMENT THAT HE BE AUTHORIZED, WHICH ARE LAID DOWN IN THE INSURANCE SUPERVISION LAW, ARE CONTRARY TO ARTICLES 59 AND 60 OF THE TREATY AND THEREFORE ALSO TO THE DIRECTIVE.

Plný text judikátu (Entire text of the Judgment):