Odbor kompatibility s právem ES Úřad vlády ČR	I S A P Informační Systém pro Aproximaci Práva
	Databáze č. 17 : Databáze judikatury

ă Odbor kompatibility s právem ES, Úřad vlády ČR - určeno pouze pro potřebu ministerstev a ostatních ústředních orgánů


	Číslo (Kód CELEX): Number (CELEX Code):		61973J0166

	Název: Title:		JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 16 JANUARY 1974. RHEINMUEHLEN-DUESSELDORF V EINFUHR- UND VORRATSSTELLE FUER GETREIDE UND FUTTERMITTEL. PRELIMINARY RULING REQUESTED BY THE BUNDESFINANZHOF. CONSEQUENCES OF JUDGMENTS OF APPEAL COURTS. CASE 166-73.

	Publikace: Publication:		REPORTS OF CASES 1974 PAGES 0033 - 0040

	Předmět (klíčová slova): Keywords		AGRICULTURE;CEREALS;

	Související předpisy: Corresponding acts:		157E177

	Odkaz na souvisejicí judikáty: Corresponding Judgements:		Meilicke Case C-83/91 Meilicke v ADV/ORGA [1992] ECR I-4871 · Zabala Erasun Joined Cases C-422-424/93 Zabala Erasun v Instituto Nacional de Empleo [1995] ECR I-1567


	Plný text: Fulltext:		Ne

Fakta:
Rheinmühlen Düsseldorf (“Rheinmühlen”) exported pearl barley from the Federal Republic of Germany. As a result of the particulars given by Rheinmühlen, to the effect that the goods were being delivered to third countries, the Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (“Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle”) granted Rheinmühlen refunds for exports for third countries. Subsequently, the Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle withdrew these refunds on the grounds that the deliveries had not been made to third countries but to other Member States. The action instituted by Rheinmühlen was dismissed by the Finanzgericht (fiscal court of first instance). On appeal, however, the Bundesfinanzhof sent the case back for reconsideration together with the instruction that the decision to make a refund could only be revoked to the extent that the refund for ‘third countries’ exceeded the refund for ‘Member States’. According to the rules of the Finanzgerichtsordnung (Rules of Procedure for the Finanzgerichte), the court to which the case is sent back is bound by the judgement of the court which has sent the case back.
Upon reconsideration of the case, the Finanzgericht came to the conclusion that the view of the Bundesfinanzgericht was not consistent with the system of refunds provided for by Regulation 16/62 and by order dated 7 May 1973. The Finanzgericht therefore decided to under Article 177 of the Treaty refer the matter to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. Rheinmühlen appealed to the Bundesfinanzhof against this decision, invoking the above-mentioned provision of the Finanzgerichtsordnung according to which the opinion of the court which sent a case back to the inferior instance is binding upon the latter. Rheinmühlen argued that a reference to the Court of Justice was unlawful under these circumstances.
The Bundesfinanzhof decided to stay the proceedings and under Article 177 of the Treaty referred to the Court of Justice the question whether the second paragraph of Article 177 gives to a court or tribunal against whose decisions there is a judicial remedy under national law a completely unfettered right to refer questions to the Court of Justice or whether it leaves unaffected rules of domestic law to the contrary whereby a court is bound on points of law by the judgements of the courts superior to it.

Názor soudu a komentář:
“Article 177 is essential for the preservation of the Community character of the law established by the Treaty and has the object of ensuring that in all circumstances this law is the same in all States of the Community. Whilst it thus aims to avoid divergences in the interpretation of Community law which national courts have to apply, it likewise tends to ensure this application by making available to the national judge a means of eliminating difficulties which may be occasioned by the requirement of giving Community law its full effect within the framework of the judicial system of the Member States.” Article 177 of the Treaty, which is “absolutely binding on the national judge” “gives the national courts the power and, where appropriate, imposes on the obligation to refer a case for a preliminary ruling, as soon as the judge perceives either of his own motion or at the request of the parties that the litigation depends on a point referred to in the first paragraph of Article 177”. In referring matters to the Court of Justice, the national courts have “the widest discretion”.
Under these principles, the Court, in principle, rejects the view that a national provision could provide that inferior courts are absolutely bound by the opinion of superior courts and thus unable to refer questions to the Court of Justice. The Court considers that such a provision could be accepted for the case that the superior court has already made a reference to the Court of Justice. Even in that case, however, the Court finds that “the inferior court must be free, if it considers that the ruling on law made by the superior court could lead it to give a judgement contrary to Community law, to refer to the Court the questions which concern it”.
The Court, which thus assumes the jurisdiction to rule on questions of the interpretation of Article 177, gives the provision a binding nature and superiority over national laws of judicial procedure. The Court has in its subsequent case-law upheld the view that the national courts have a wide discretion in the assessment of whether a preliminary ruling is necessary and based this interpretation on the ground that it is the national courts which must assume the responsibility for the decision in the case at hand and which have full knowledge of the relevant facts. The Court has, however, also developed the principle that it has the power to examine whether a preliminary ruling is necessary and in particular whether the question referred to it is not merely hypothetical. As a related measure, the Court has demanded that the national court, in making the reference, has to provide the Court of Justice with the factual and legal information necessary to undertake such examination. (See in particular Meilicke; Zabala Erasun)

Shrnutí (Summary of the Judgment):
POWER OF THE NATIONAL JUDGE TO REFER TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE, EITHER OF HIS OWN MOTION OR AT THE REQUEST OF THE PARTIES, QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE INTERPRETATION OR THE VALIDITY OF PROVISIONS OF COMMUNITY LAW IN A PENDING ACTION IS VERY WIDE. IT CANNOT BE TAKEN AWAY BY A RULE OF NATIONAL LAW WHEREBY A JUDGE IS BOUND ON POINTS OF LAW BY THE RULINGS OF SUPERIOR COURTS. IT WOULD BE OTHERWISE IF THE QUESTIONS PUT BY THE INFERIOR COURT WERE SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME AS QUESTIONS ALREADY PUT BY THE SUPERIOR COURT.

Plný text judikátu (Entire text of the Judgment):